For the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, a roughly six-hundred-mile natural gas pipeline stretching from West Virginia to North Carolina, a right-of-way to intersect the Appalachian Trail was essential. Although the proposed pipeline crossed below the trail by about six-hundred feet, it would require clearing of trees and plants along its length, drilling through a mountain, and constructing three compressor stations. Throughout the project’s history, community and environmental groups opposed its construction. One coalition challenged different aspects of the pipeline permitting process under federal law and won a favorable U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit verdict. But the Supreme Court reversed an aspect of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, holding that the U.S. Forest Service has the authority to grant a right-of-way on land crossed by the Appalachian Trail. However, even a Supreme Court win was not enough to save the project: the Atlantic Coast Pipeline was canceled shortly after it received a favorable decision from the nation’s highest court. The showdown between Atlantic Coast Pipeline and the Appalachian Trail exemplifies the tension between escalating U.S. oil and gas development and protecting spaces for recreational, scientific, cultural, and aesthetic uses. This Note argues the legislative and executive history behind the National Trails System Act of 1968 supports the protection of trails on federal lands, and the plain language of a statutory trio reserves to Congress the ability to grant oil and gas pipeline rights-of-way across national trails in the National Park System, such as the Appalachian Trail. In addition, this Note suggests an alternative framework for granting oil and gas pipeline rights-of-ways across national trails both in and outside the National Park System. Given that national trails were created to offer an escape from development and industry, oil and gas pipeline rights-of-way should only be granted across national trails on federal lands if no prudent and feasible alternative exists. By limiting oil and gas pipeline development on national trails, such trails may be preserved for future users, untrammeled and undisturbed, as escapes.
The plaintiffs in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco faced a particularly challenging legal problem: not only was a large corporation polluting their local environment, but the corporation was located in Canada, while the plaintiffs lived in the United States. Although a variety of environmental agreements have been struck between the United States and its border neighbors over the last two hundred years, the plaintiffs chose not to invoke any of these (relatively toothless) compacts. Instead, they took their case to the courts. In 2018, the Ninth Circuit held that United States courts had properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the Canadian defendant—a success for the plaintiffs, and one that future plaintiffs in transboundary pollution cases may be able to use to their advantage. However, personal jurisdiction is far from the only hurdle facing plaintiffs in transboundary pollution lawsuits. This Note argues that the United States should address transboundary pollution through an enforceable multilateral agreement rather than leaving such cases to domestic courts; identifies the North American Free Trade Agreement as a particularly promising forum for such an agreement; and briefly sketches what such a solution could look like.
In Virginia Uranium v. Warren, the Supreme Court wrestled with the question of whether Virginia was preempted from banning uranium mining with the goal of preventing milling and tailings disposal, activities that can only be regulated by the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. While the Court upheld Virginia’s ban, it did so in a fractured decision that reveals divisions about obstacle preemption, a category of preemption that posits state laws that interfere with the objectives of federal statutes are preempted. This doctrine has been criticized for its vagueness and has created unlikely alliances between conservative and liberal Justices, who are unlikely to accept obstacle preemption claims. The outcome in Virginia Uranium suggests that the current Court is particularly unlikely to be receptive to obstacle preemption claims. This Note concludes that this reticence provides an opportunity for states to pass environmentally protective policies beyond what was previously thought possible in the field of nuclear energy.
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands ended 2019 as the first court in history to establish that protection from dangerous climate change is a human right thereby requiring the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to align with internationally recognized climate targets. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation establishes that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) requires the Netherlands to take adequate action to prevent the real and imminent risk of dangerous climate change. Specifically, the Urgenda decision enforces a national goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25 percent by 2020. This ruling adds teeth to several climate-focused reports and treaties such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Doha Amendment. While the ECHR applies to all European nations, the Dutch Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ECHR in Urgenda is not binding outside the Netherlands. The European Court of Human Rights creates binding interpretations and precedent of the ECHR. Because the Urgenda decision was cemented in the Court of Human Rights’ case law and precedent, however, the decision may serve as a strategic template for how to achieve similar results using the ECHR to hold national governments legally accountable to climate change mitigation targets. For non-European nations outside the scope of these laws, Urgenda may provide a bode of confidence that there may yet be avenues available in the fight against dangerous climate change.