In 2019, the Supreme Court decided Sturgeon v. Frost for the second time. Sturgeon arose because of a 1980 federal statute, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, that limited the executive branch’s jurisdiction over public land in Alaska to lands to which the federal government holds title. This is a major deviation from the default public land management regime, in which the federal government can regulate private activity on state or private land under the Property Clause of the Constitution to achieve public land objectives. Because this limitation only applies in Alaska, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act can be thought of as a public land “bargain” between one state and the federal government. This Note discusses public land “bargains,” like the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, and proposes a framework for assessing future “bargains.” To do this, it first presents a taxonomy of existing public land “bargains,” focusing on the rhetorical context surrounding their passage. Second, it presents some of the arguments made by modern public land “bargain” advocates. Third, it argues that public land “bargains” can make it more challenging for the federal government to promote healthy ecological systems and achieve statutory goals. Fourth, it proposes a loose theoretical framework for assessing public land “bargains” in light of those costs. Finally, it argues that the costs of public land “bargains” might be avoidable if land management agencies instead work to build trust with public land communities.